WHEREAS the education of the Armenian youth is a necessity for the progress of the Armenian Liberation Struggle, and by taking into consideration that a large number of the Armenian youth living in the western United States is more fluent in English than Armenian, the Haytoug Editorial Staff has made the conscious and time consuming effort to translate some of the Armenian articles into English.

However, by also realizing the importance of the prolongation of the existence of Armenian culture in the Diaspora, the Haytoug Editorial Staff asks its readers to consciously take the initiative of also reading the articles in Armenian—even if this could require an extra effort.

The Armenian articles are not printed for decorative purposes.

The Haytoug Editorial Staff would also like to bring to the attention of its readers that in the case of the articles printed in two languages, the language of the larger title, is the one which the article was originally written in. The translations could sometimes alter the original meaning of the article. Hence, the official views of Haytoug and/or the authors are contained in the articles written in their original language.
If we take a retrospective look at our days of independence in 1918, we will realize that our independence has been different from most in the following aspects:

First, the independence of Armenia materialized during the most tragic days of our history — only three years after the start of the Genocide. The genocidal Turkish Government attempted in 1915 to deprive the Armenian People once and for all of its basic right to live by wiping its existence off the face of the earth. And yet, as the most obvious proof of the failure of the Turkish dream, the sons of the Armenian People proclaimed independence for Armenia as a result of the brave and heroic battles fought on different fronts three years after 1915.

Our independence was unique also in that it was short-lived — only two years. In an economically and militarily weak position, the Republic of Armenia fell two years after its creation as a victim of the immoral games of the superpowers.

This short-lived Republic, however, presents a great symbolic importance for us today. It symbolizes the unyielding will of our People to struggle, even in the face of the most unbeatable odds. It demonstrates that the natural need of our People to be free and to exercise its right to live independently creates an enormous potential in our People; a potential which creates battles such as the Sardarabad, Gharakiliseh, and Bash-Aparan.

Today, 67 years after the independence of Armenia, it is possible that the period...
of independence is condemned to the pages of history. For us, however, May 28, 1918, must become a daily issue. In other words, we should have the ability to see a parallel between the period from 1915 to 1920 and our present situation. Today, our generation is being subjected to the dangerous and absorbing conditions of the Diaspora by means of a white massacre, just as we were subjected to a different kind of massacre at the hands of the Turkish Government in 1915. Of course, the immediate horrors of the Genocide were more devastating than today's Genocide. However, today's genocide which results in our complex of feeling culturally inferior throughout the western world and which erases and rewrites history in many countries, is just as threatening and horrifying to us. The time has come to create a unified front against the enemy which tries to bury us, as was created in 1918. Perhaps under different circumstances, yet with the same commitment, it is possible to create the same front which was created by our grandparents about 67 years ago.

Then onward toward new battlefields.

Onward toward continuous struggle, until victory, and until complete and final victory.
THE TURKISH LEFT
PART III

summarized by Niva K.

Note: The following is a summary of an article titled "The Turkish Working Class and Socialist Movement in Perspective," written by Mehmet Salah. The article was originally published in Khamsin, a journal published by revolutionary socialists of the Middle East.

During the past years a number of Turkish leftist organizations have made announcements acknowledging the Armenian Genocide of 1915. Some of these organizations have gone as far as recognizing the right of the Armenians to return to Eastern Turkey, i.e. not necessarily Western Armenia. It is still debatable whether cooperation with the Turkish left would result in any advancement of the Armenian Cause. The bitter memory of cooperation with Turkish organizations in the early 1900s is still fresh in the minds of many Armenians. The study of the Turkish left, as well as other national and social movements and liberation struggles, is however necessary for maturation and broadening of the scope of the Armenian political mentality.

The third biggest grouping on the Turkish Left of the 1970s was of organizations which could be classified 'independent.' The one which has to be mentioned first is Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Path), which claimed the heritage of the guerrilla movement of the early 1970s and presented itself as the continuation of the THKP-C—the famous guerrilla organization of that period. The strength of the legend of the guerrilla movement was quite effective in putting its stamp on the orientation of the new generation of young revolutionary students.

Yet along with its prestige, the memories of the guerrilla movement's defeat were still very much alive. This was especially true for the leadership cadres. For this reason, the bulk of the 'true followers' maintained that the conditions for guerrilla struggle were not mature enough. As a result, Dev-Yol experienced an early split which gave birth to the Dev-Yol current (Revolutionary Left) who immediately started their 'armed propaganda.' It was after this split that Dev-Yol rapidly took on a massive character.

Despite its large size, this current remained a petty bourgeois youth movement, far from the working class. Although Dev-Yol had an important function in the armed resistance against fascists, this form of struggle did not lead to the political maturation of its cadres.

If Dev-Yol was the centre, then the other organizations of the independent left were at two opposite ends. Kurtuws, while opposing Maoist and pro-Moscow currents, rigorously strove to establish a more 'orthodox' marxist theoretical base, studying Lenin through Stalin in particular. It remained a smaller current than Dev-Yol because of its critical approach to the guerrilla movement and its relatively high theoretical level.

At the other end of the spectrum of the independent left were the 'followers' of the guerrilla movement. These cadres began 'armed propaganda' actions in the mid-1970s. These organizations did not take part in the active resistance to the fascists. Instead, they inclined rather to assassinations of the leaders of the fascist movement, USA military officers, police chiefs, and the like.
These groups had such names as THKP-C (Turkey People's Liberation Party and Front), MLSPB (Marxist-Leninist armed Propaganda Squad), HDD (Revolutionary Vanguards of the People), yet they scored no political gains. They were accused by both left and right of being responsible for 'anarchy'...

TOWARDS 12 SEPTEMBER 1980

In January 1978, a defection by eleven MPs from the JP aided the formation of an RPP government. This was one of the last temporary solutions to the political crises that had been gathering pace since 1974. The RPP government was formed at a time when workers' mobilisation was at a peak, mass organisations were their most active and powerful, the fascist movement was on the offensive. Now, this party was in power at a time of severe economic crises and of political and social polarisation. Under these circumstances, the masses expected solutions to two urgent problems: A reversal of their progressive immobilisation and a halt to fascist terror. The RPP, not unexpectedly, failed to provide an answer to these problems.

The incompetence and failure of the RPP government did not mean the masses turned to the socialist movement. Quite the contrary, the disappointment of the masses with the RPP pushed them into demoralisation and apoliticism. Some important developments showing the depth of this demoralisation can be seen in the decrease in DISK's membership. Inter-trade union conflicts resulted in the formation of independent trade unions and lessening support for the socialist movement.

These conditions caused severe crises in the socialist groupings. In the late 1970s the Turkish Left experienced its most serious splits and internal crises. These internal fights, which brought neither theoretical development nor indifferent orientations, caused only more demoralisation among revolutionary cadres.

When a new MC (Nationalist Front) government was formed by the leadership of the JP and the fascist NAP (National Action Party) there seemed to be a revival in workers' mobilisation. Unofficial strikes occurred, some of which resulted in major clashes with the police. But this was only temporary and exhausted in a short time.

On the eve of the 12 September coup, around 50 thousand workers, a majority in DISK, were on strike. Yet these strikes lacked morale and discipline. The agitation of the socialist movement was meagre and inefficient on this matter. In some months, hundreds of thousands of auto, rail, and textile workers, most of them TURK-IS members, were on the eve of new strikes. The 12 September coup was not too late...

THE AFTERMATH OF THE 12 SEPTEMBER 1980 COUP

The losses suffered by the Turkish Left from the 1980 coup were immense. The one loss which has most affected the movement and will have long-term consequences was the marked absence of moral support and sympathy from the masses whom claimed to be the leaders and political vanguard. This indicated that the Turkish Left had lost something of the legitimacy gained during the 1960s' struggles and consolidated in the early years of the post-1974 period. The masses did not regard the Turkish Left as mature enough to be a candidate for power in these two decades, but it did regard the Turkish Left as a serious political force. The aftermath of the 12 September coup proves that this posture of the Turkish Left has been exhausted in the eyes of the masses.

The masses' impassivity in the face of the savage attacks on the left by the Turkish State did not, of course, come out of the blue. Facing this reality under the more difficult circumstances of illegality, imprisonment, detention, or trial, however, has been incomparably less bearable for the left. For this reason alone, the coup, with all its shocking effects, will have long-term consequences—if not necessarily entirely negative.

In the years preceding 12 September 1980, the programmes and slogans, method of its fight against fascists, style of work in mass organisations, of the Turkish left, had all contributed to the terrible (Cont. on pg. 13)
DREAMOGRAM

Dreaming
about the million
and a half
I sent him
or her
a dreamogram
asking to explain
what is
the meaning of this freeway
where
we all drive
and drive
where
Cal-Trans workers
Highway Patrolmen
are not
to help
but
to kill
where
some
drive in the right lane
others
in the fast lane
some take an exit
and never
re-enter again
I asked him
or her
if
the auto industry
lobby
got to him
or her
for allowing
one and
a half cars
to be driven off the cliff
it has been
some time now
three years now
and no reply
to my
dreamogram
even a hand
delivered
letter
would've gotten
to me.
I know
he or she
is there
and exists
as even my mom
told me so
and we all know
moms don't lie—
and we all know
how Rene
showed us that
if he or she
is perfect
and if
existence
is a form of
perfection
therefore he or she
exists
then why
is he
or she
ignoring me and
disregarding us
so successfully
why is it
that
when Hubbard calls
when Swaggart calls
when Doctorian calls
he
or she replies
quickly
when people sin
he
or she
dams
so swiftly
but still
ignores me
is it
because
Marianna
convicted me
if so
why does he
or she
protect
Cal-Trans workers
and
Highway Patrolmen
who kill
by the millions
why
does he or she
send them
the gas company
to insulate them
and their roofs
why does he
or she
send them
the Card
for them
not to leave home
without it—
why is it
why
that he or she
discriminates so
as he
or she has so far
and throughout
brilliantly
done so
I ask myself
why
and wonder.
I guess
I'll go on wondering
I'll go on wandering
until he
or she replies
and when that will be
I don't know
since as we say
and always say:
only
God
knows.

VIKEN H.
He is not a boy-
He is a man.
Try to probe his inner mind,
And see why he has killed a man.
For Freedom perhaps-
Or land.
What is Land?

Generations of war—
Continuous revenge—
For Land—
For Power—
Do they rule the World?

He has a wife—
A little girl.
He is a man.
Probe his mind.
What is Land?

Do you see the despairity of death
on his face?
The loss of hope?
That is it—
The loss of hope.

Sophie Chahinian
Long Beach Sosse

The Armenian Republic (1918)
May 28

At the beginning of World War I, Czar Nicholas II of Russia promised the Armenians an autonomous state created from the Turkish provinces if they would support them in the war. A similar promise was given to the Armenian Catholicos George V during the Czar's official visit to Tiflis, Georgia. The same promises given by the Czar were also reiterated by the Allies. The Armenians were not aware of the Soviet Treaty of London which stated that Turkey would be divided between the signatories of which there were no Armenians.

When the Czarist government made way for the Kevorksky regime, Kevorksky immediately declared the Armenian provinces autonomous until the final settlement at the Peace Conference.

During this period the Armenian people rebuilt their ruined fatherland. However, when the Bolsheviks took control of the government, all Russian soldiers were recalled from the Caucasian front. This left the Caucasian peoples at the mercy of the Ottomans. Realizing this fact, the Armenians, Georgians, and the Armenians, Georgians, and Azerbaijaniz banded together in an attempt to hold back the Turks. After the retirement of the Russians even the combined efforts of these three peoples found it difficult to keep up the war effort. They lacked money, supplies, and communication which tied up their war machine.

On December 5, 1917, the Transcaucasian government concluded an armistice with the Turks. But this armistice was not to last as the Turks again began the hostilities. However, another peace treaty was signed on May 11 in Batum. But before the treaty went into effect, the Turks again violated it and occupied Alexandrapol from where they started to drive to the north and southeast. This was the most crucial point of the war for the Armenian people. The Armenian people realized if they lost the war, the same fate would befall them as those of their brethren in Turkish Armenia.

Fighting with a ferocity born of desperation, the Armenians halted the Turkish advance in three decisive battles. These battles took place between May 23 and May 28, 1918 at Karakilisseh, Bash-Abaran, and Sartarabad. General Nazarbekian, the commander in chief, directed the first battle; the second was commanded by General Doro, and the third by General Bilikian. The battle of Sartarabad was the most stubborn and bloody, very costly to the Turkish armies. Its victory raised the spirit of the people. General Bilikian now gave the order to march on Alexandrapol when news arrived from Batum that peace had been signed and the war was over.

On May 26, the Turkish government presented it ultimatum. The same day in Tiflis, at a session of the Transcaucasian Confederation, the Georgian representative proposed a resolution to disband the Confederation. Thus came the end to the Transcaucasian federation. At the same time the Georgian National Council declared the independence of Georgia. Azerbaijan followed suit the next day. Under the circumstances, on May 28, the Armenian National Council declared Armenia an independent republic.

The Peace Treaty of Batum between Turkey and Armenia was signed on June 4, 1918. This was the first international act which Armenia signed as an independent
state. Turkey was the first power to recognize Armenia's independence.

Then in Armenia, there was nothing but ruins. The leaders of the new nation had a job of mass reconstruction. They could not count on help from the Allies, Turkey, or Russia. There were no experts on politics, and food was almost none. The first Premier of Armenia was Kachazuni. The Armenian National Council had declared itself the supreme governing body of the Armenian provinces and set itself up in Yerevan. The Armenian National Council assumed the functions of a legislative body under the title of "Council of Armenia." The chairman of the council was also the President of the Republic.

When the war ended, Turkish troops left Armenia, and an influx of refugees and food from the free world began. On May 20, 1920 the first American shipload of flour arrived in Batum. Thereafter produce was flooding into Armenia from the Allied powers.

One year after its founding, Armenia already was an organized state, equipped with an efficient administrative machinery. A large number of nations recognized her independence and exchanged diplomatic representatives. A delegation of the Armenian Government proceeded to Paris to take part in the Peace Conference.

The creation of the independent republic was the signal of a patriotic wave, rallying Armenians from all corners of the world, all of whom poured in their voluntary contributions to rebuild Armenia. The Armenian-Americans alone contributed near $2 million. In other countries of the world where an Armenian community existed, contributions poured in to aid the newly formed republic.

The final problem was the boundary of the Armenian Republic. This would be decided by the treaty to be made between the Allies and Turkey. President Wilson, who was a champion of the Armenian cause, desired to establish a protectorate over Armenia controlled by the United States. The Allies agreed with Wilson's proposal, but the treaty with Turkey was unduly detained.

In January, 1919, the Big Four Powers issued the following declaration concerning the fate of Turkey: "Because of the historic misgovernment of the Turks of their subject peoples and the terrible massacres of the Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire." The peace treaty with Turkey was signed at Sevres on August 10, 1920. It was at this time that Mustafa Kemal became a power to contend with.

The treaty of Sevres was pro-Armenian in every sense of the word. It made the United States an arbitrator in all Turkish and Armenian disputes and forced Turkey to recognize Armenia as a free and independent republic. However, the success of the Kemalist movement doomed the Treaty of Sevres.

One month after the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, both Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia attacked the Republic of Armenia. The republic could not stand up under the joint attack and succumbed on December 2, 1920.
BACK TO OUR LANDS

On Thursday, May 2, 1985, Kegham Kevonian of the Land and Culture Organization lectured with great fervor, clarity and intensity to a full house at Ferrahian's Avedissian Hall. Although many of the predominantly older crowd had not heard of or been acquainted with the Organization prior to the evening, they followed the lecture and slide/film presentation intently... Just what is the Land and Culture Organization, and why hasn't the L.A. Armenian community heard of its work before? The LCO, created in 1977, is dedicated to the preservation and betterment of the Armenian patrimony. Its work is carried on mainly on the fields, where a handful of Armenian youth from all over the world spend months restoring and preserving ancient Armenian monasteries and other places of importance through active construction work. Since 1977, the LCO has concentrated most of its activities on land belonging to the Armenian Church in North Iran, particularly on the monasteries of St. Thaddeus and St. Stepanos. Since that time, the Organization's scope and endeavors have greatly widened and diversified. While pursuing an ongoing program of research and exploration, as well as a series of longterm plans, the LCO is currently focusing its efforts on two main projects: the preservation of the monastery church of Dzordzor, situated north-west of St. Thaddeus; and the restoration of traditional Armenian village dwellings in the region of Kessab (North Syria).

Kevonian showed many breathtaking slides of areas in "Turkish Armenia," Vaspourakan (Van) and Cilicia; areas in North Iran, and finally those of work being undertaken in Kessab.

More important than the showing of any slides or films, Kevonian sent the people a message, and it was a powerful one. We are all, in part, aware of the pitiful conditions of monasteries and communities, which are being neglected and destroyed, both in Turkey, and in other areas. We realize this, but fail to understand the extent of the damage. Destruction of our ancient landmarks is part of a daily process to render extinct our past, our identity, therefore our present. Kevonian explained the importance of coming into physical contact with the land, our homeland. The images of our homeland we often have are muddled and abstract. The youth, explained Kevonian, must come into contact with the land, and take that "spirit" back to their respective temporary homes in the diaspora. Today's impossible, stressed Kevonian, will be possible tomorrow. The path we must undertake in our struggle is long and hard. In order to make the struggle less of just an abstract notion, we must realize that possibilities do exist. Vestiges of our ancient lands exist, in northern Iran and what was once our homeland. We, today's youth, must embark on our own personal journeys back to our lands, in essence, back to ourselves.

The LCO needs funds desperately—and just as importantly, active participation in the form of field work. Any kind of support, however, will undoubtedly lead to the furtherance of their, and our, important ends.

For more information, or for contributions we urge everyone to write to Mr. Kevonian at the following address:

Organisation terre et culture
16, rue Notre-Dame de Lorette
75009 Paris FRANCE

Haytoug Staff Writer

ARMENIA REBORN

A GLORIOUS MORNING: MAY 28, 1918
establishing the dominance of this or that left grouping in any particular locality. The reason was obvious—to encourage the masses' participation in anti-fascist struggle required, apart from experienced political and military leadership, and traditionally trusted organisations, a measure of democracy in order to 'civilise' the competition between left groupings. The Turkish Left was utterly bereft of a meaningful democratic practice, therefore a struggle which had to be isolated from other revolutionary groupings necessarily had to be isolated from the masses too. The so-called 'liberated zones' in some districts of some cities where the revolutionary movement was strong enough to control many aspects of the daily life are a striking example of this. It was this weird anti-Fascist struggle, or self-defence, which only burdened the revolutionary cadres with its unbearable weight, and led the masses to turn to other forces, more 'serious' and 'trusted', to protect themselves from Fascist terror and death. First the RPP and later the armed forces...

The famous so-called 'armed struggle' waged from the mid-1970s onwards was another cause of the alienation of the Turkish Left from the masses. Despite extraordinary sacrifices, the armed struggle brought about no positive results. The guerrilla activities gave neither morale to revolutionary cadres, created no enthusiasm, sympathy or interest in the masses, nor caused panic among fascists and police forces. In fact, they only provided considerable material for right wing demagoguery about 'anarchy' and 'terror'...

The last but not the least important factor in the tragedy of the Turkish Left was the disastrous internal struggles in the mass organisations and particularly in DISK which had a devastating effect on the relations between the left political groupings and workers and other toilers. Having witnessed such deleterious power struggles waged with violence in their own organisations, and having seen the same kind of trade unionists coming to power time and time again under different political labels, the workers started to

Turkish Left

(Cont. from pg. 7)

outcome of the coup. First and foremost, the left was unable to put forward a coherent political programme, particularly as an alternative to the RPP's.

Secondly, the nature of the anti-Fascist struggle itself functioned to isolate the revolutionary cadres from ordinary citizens who themselves had been the subject of the fascist terror. Despite their rhetoric, the anti-fascist struggle was waged solely as a means of
feel alien not only from these organisations and left groupings but from politics as well.

These negative points in combination led to the abrupt rupture between the masses and left groupings immediately after the 12 September coup.


After 20 years of struggle, will the Turkish Left be able to draw positive lessons from its theoretical impasse, political capability, and bad memories of its relations with the masses, and start to build anew again? A close look at the last two decades might illuminate today's developments and the prospects for tomorrow.

Despite the limits imposed by Stalinist and Kemalist influences, the 1960s was a period of rapid and productive development.

In this decade—the first ascent of the Turkish Left—the young cadres' enthusiasm for Marxist theory, the left intellectuals' intensive contributions, and the existence of dialogue among various groupings, all contributed to a healthy development in the theoretical domain. The same period was also marked by a serious concern with the outside world and an awakening internationalism contravening the nationalist prejudices originating from the traditions of Stalinism and Kemalism.

Throughout the 1960s, the Turkish Left experienced relations with the masses which were healthy and improving. At the outset, the enthusiastic interest of the middle class intellectuals and some sections of the Kurdish and Turkish peasantry towards TIP (Turkish Workers' Party) was noteworthy. The socialist cadres responded to this by vivid and impressive propaganda. Later on, young militants successfully leading large student masses, sections of the poor peasantry, together with limited relations with workers, were also important experiences for the maturing Turkish Left.

The 1960s were notable for the enthusiasm and strength of the fresh revolutionary wave, the weakness of RPP liberalism, the absence of the trade union bureaucracy's control over the newly awakened working class, and the absence for low level of factional feuds.

The 1970s were quite different. Marxist theory was no longer a subject of enthusiasm. The positive effect of the left intellectuals of university circles who were eagerly involved in the 1960s no longer existed. With the disappointment of the 1971 defeat, these cadres withdrew into their academic milieu in the 1970s.
TURKISH LEFT

In the same period, the Turkish Left's concern with international problems went no further than transcating items of pro-Soviet or Maoist literature. Although the effect of Kemalist nationalism diminished considerably in the 1970s, compared to the previous decade, the decline of internationalism on the left represented another backward development. The international revolutionary events which shocked the world in the 1970s were watched only passively by the Turkish Left. For example, the rise of Eurocommunism attracted no serious attention. Other important developments, such as the Lebanese civil war and the decline in the Palestinian liberation movement, received nothing more than simplistic rhetoric of the 'long live...' variety.

To sum up, a few more remarks about the political maturity of the revolutionary cadres and their ability to lead the masses are appropriate. As already mentioned, during the 1970s, these cadres displayed no more creativity in this domain. Their connection with the working class was made only through the trade-union bureaucracy. On the other hand the peasant mobilisation of the 1960s were not witnessed in the 1970s. The student movement was no longer a unitary mass movement, as a result, there are only few examples of mass confrontation with the police, street fights, and so on.

We can discern a strange or ill-fated development of the Turkish Left in its last two decades. The revolutionary movement seemed to go no further than the point it had reached by the late 1960s. It is as if the Turkish revolutionary movement developed backwards during the 1970s.

WHAT DOES THE FUTURE PROMISE?

Before some final words on the prospects of the development of the Turkish left, we should first glance at the working class. Without a doubt, the working class will put a stamp on any new political or social revival. After the experiences of the last two decades, the working class will be mature enough to shoulder a leading role in future struggles. The increasing numerical strength of the working class is also another factor in this estimate. The proletariat now consists of at least 25 per cent of the economically active population.

It should not be forgotten that the Turkish working class still lacks sufficient political experience. It never experienced any organisation on a mass scale other than trade unions. As a class, the workers have always been remote from the political organisations. For example, the KPP could not organise workers en masse. Despite this negative background, with integral to its numerical strength, its concentration in certain industrial areas, its nucleus who have been in the cities for few generations, its being in a rapid process of cultural development, and its not being under strong influence of religion, the Turkish working class is on solid ground for political maturation.

On this, of course, everything will depend on the Turkish left. Without hesitation, one can say that after the crushing defeat of September, 1980, the Turkish left will emerge in the near future having undergone important changes in every sense.

While there are not yet strong indications of such changes, there is one important factor in the life of the Turkish left whose consequences should bear fruit in the medium term. For almost the first time in its history, the left has been experiencing exile conditions in large numbers. It is rather striking that this Turkish exile existence is the first since the 'young Turks' flooded to Western Europe toward the end of the nineteenth century. That generations few decades in Europe left their imprint on Turkish political thought and life for almost the whole of the next century.

If almost half of the vanguard of the Turkish left is in exile, the other half is in prison.

Though with concentration camp-like conditions, it is in the prisons where the militancy and determination for struggle is alive and continues to be kept alive.

After the theoretical, political, and organisational bankruptcy which all factions of the Turkish left faced to some

(Con. on pg. 19)
In Turkish Prisons:  
A Report From Amnesty International

Note: The following article appeared in the New York Review of Books (May 30, 1985) as an Amnesty International Report regarding the present day conditions existing within Turkish prisons.

Amnesty International's concerns in Turkey continue to be as they have been for some years past, the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience, widespread and systematic torture and ill-treatment of political prisoners, and the imposition and use of the death penalty. There is also concern that the difficulties lawyers experience in seeing their imprisoned clients and preparing the defense case and the use of statements in court that are alleged to have been induced by torture may affect the fairness of trials in military courts.

The exact number of political prisoners in Turkey at the present time is not known. On August 1, 1984, a government spokesman told the press agency, AGENCIA FRANCE-PRESSE, that 7,500 political prisoners were held in military prisons. However, this figure does not include those political prisoners whose legal proceedings have been completed and who are serving their sentences in civilian prisons, nor does it include those persons not yet charged, but held under martial law, which permits incommunicado detention in police stations for forty-five days.

Although civilian government was restored to Turkey following elections in November 1983, martial law continues in twenty-three of the sixty-seven provinces including all major cities, such as Ankara, Istanbul, Adana, Izmir, and Diyarbekir, and a state of emergency exists in twelve further provinces. Political offenses continue to be tried by military courts, although special state security courts, have been established in eight cities to deal with political offenses committed after May 1, 1984.

The Turkish authorities usually refer to all political prisoners as "extremist militants" or "terrorists." During the five years preceding the military coup of September 1980 political violence had resulted in more than 5,000 assassinations by right-wing and left-wing groups. Some groups have continued to engage in violent opposition to the government. However, although many of those now in prison for political offenses have been charged with violent crimes, Amnesty International knows of hundreds of political prisoners whom it considers to be prisoners of conscience, imprisoned for their nonviolent political or religious activities or beliefs, in violation of their rights to freedom of expression and association as laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights to which Turkey is a State Party. They include members of the Turkish Peace Association, the Turkish Workers' party, the Turkish Socialist Workers' party, the Turkish Workers' and Peasants' party, the Turkish Communist party, TÖB-DER (the teachers' association), and IGD (the Progressive Youth Association).

Many journalists, publishers, writers, translators, and academics have been prosecuted under Article 142 of the Turkish penal code with "making communist propaganda," simply because of their involvement in the publication of material which expresses left-wing political ideas. Nearly 1,500 trade unionists are on trial because of their legitimate trade union activities. Although the leading members of DISK, the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions, have now been released from prison, their trial, which started in December 1981, continues; and with the incorporation of DISK-affiliated unions in the trial the total number of defendants is now 1,474, for seventy-eight of whom the military prosecutor has demanded the death penalty.

Some of Amnesty International's adopted prisoners of conscience are Kurds charged with "separatist" activities. The lack of recognition by the Turkish authorities of the existence of the Kurdish ethnic
minority and the prohibitions on the use of the Kurdish language or any manifestation of a Kurdish cultural identity had led long before the military coup of 1980 to the establishment of many different Kurdish groups, some of which used violence and others which worked nonviolently for the preservation of the Kurdish language and culture and for the official recognition of the Kurds. The Turkish authorities appear to have made little distinction between groups that used violence to achieve their aims and those that neither advocated nor practiced violence, and Kurdish prisoners include people from both categories.

Other persons regarded as prisoners of conscience by Amnesty International are those charged under Article 163 of the Turkish penal code with trying to change the secular nature of the Turkish state. Many of these are members of Islamic sects, but in June and July of 1984 and again in December 1984 Amnesty International received reports of the imprisonment of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, twenty-three of whom have now been sentenced to between four years' and six years-eight months' imprisonment for their nonviolent religious activities.

Both before and after the 1980 coup Amnesty International received allegations that people taken into custody for political offenses had been tortured and that in some cases the torture was alleged to have resulted in death. From the extensive number of verbal and written accounts it has accumulated over a period of years, and from information provided by the Turkish authorities themselves in response to Amnesty International's inquiries, Amnesty International has concluded that torture is widespread and systematic in Turkey. Amnesty International believes that all persons detained in Turkey are in danger of being tortured and that only a very few of those detained are not subjected to some form of ill-treatment.

The Turkish authorities have repeatedly denied that torture is systematic. They maintain that all complaints of torture are investigated and that when torture has occurred those responsible are prosecuted. From time to time official figures are published of investigations that have taken place.

prosecutions, convictions, and acquittals. But Amnesty International knows of many cases in which complaints of torture have been made, very often by defendants in court during their trials, where no investigation of any kind appears to have taken place. Amnesty International continues to receive allegations of torture and believes that all the information in its possession indicates that torture is still being carried out as a routine practice in most police stations in Turkey and that ill-treatment of prisoners is carried out routinely in military prisons. It is worth noting in this respect that the Jehovah's Witnesses who were detained in Ankara in June and July of 1984 are alleged to have been tortured and that in October and November of 1984 the Turkish press itself carried reports concerning the alleged torture of customs officials held in connection with alleged smuggling activities at Kapikule on the border with Bulgaria. These allegations were first made by the minister of finance and customs, Vural Arikan, who was subsequently dismissed. They were reiterated by the defendants themselves at their trial in February 1985. These indications that not only political prisoners are subjected to torture are supported by other information given to Amnesty International over the years about the torture of common criminals during interrogation.

Executions, which had not taken place in Turkey since 1972, were resumed within one month of the military coup and to date fifty people have been executed, twenty-seven in connection with politically motivated killings. More than four hundred prisoners are under sentence of death and in approximately sixty cases legal proceedings have been concluded and the death sentences are awaiting ratification by the Turkish parliament. Amnesty International opposes the use of the death penalty without reservation in all cases as a violation of the right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment and has pointed out to the Turkish authorities many times that Turkey is the only member of the Council of Europe to have carried out executions in recent years, the trend in Western Europe being toward total abolition of the death penalty.
minority and the prohibitions on the use of the Kurdish language or any manifestation of a Kurdish cultural identity had led long before the military coup of 1980 to the establishment of many different Kurdish groups, some of which used violence and others which worked nonviolently for the preservation of the Kurdish language and culture and for the official recognition of the Kurds. The Turkish authorities appear to have made little distinction between groups that used violence to achieve their aims and those that neither advocated nor practiced violence, and Kurdish prisoners include people from both categories.

Other persons regarded as prisoners of conscience by Amnesty International are those charged under Article 163 of the Turkish penal code with trying to change the secular nature of the Turkish state. Many of these are members of Islamic sects, but in June and July of 1984 and again in December 1984 Amnesty International received reports of the imprisonment of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, twenty-three of whom have now been sentenced to between four years' and six years-eight months' imprisonment for their nonviolent religious activities.

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